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Abstract: A burgeoning literature exists on indicators associated with lone-actor terrorism, spree 
shooters, mass murders and other forms of targeted violence. Such studies of low- 
likelihood, high-impact crimes largely suffer from two inter-related problems: low base 
rates and long observational periods. These studies largely fail to consider whether 
risk factors are driven by temporal-cohorts within the wider observation pool or are 
uniform across the expanses of time under consideration. This paper compares a 
cohort of violent lone actors (composed of lone-actor terrorists, and solo mass 
murderer attackers) from 1990-2005 with a cohort from 2006 to 2013. We found no 
significant differences in terms of socio-demographic variables across the two temporal 
periods. The 2006-2013 cohort is significantly more likely to use the Internet in their 
attack planning, have been previously imprisoned, engaged in multiple attack methods 
(e.g. a bombing and a shooting), and targeted ordinary citizens rather than a political or 
military target for example. The results also indicate that the 2006-2013 period contains 
fewer offenders who (a) had previous military experience (b) made verbal statements 
to family/friends/wider audiences about their intent and beliefs (c) socialized face to 
face with members of a wider network (d) experienced being degraded or the target of 
an act of prejudice or unfairness (e) experienced a recent stressor and (f) interacted 
face-to-face with others holding a similar grievance. The conclusion discusses the 
research and operational implications of these findings. 
Suggested Reviewers:  
Opposed Reviewers:  
Response to Reviewers: We would like to take the opportunity to thank the 3 reviewers for their comments 
which we feel have improved this paper. In addition to a robust proof reading we have 
also responded to each of the reviewers' requests. Below, we outline these changes. 
 
R1 made comments regarding the factual errors regarding other studies. We have 
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corrected these. 
 
R1 made some suggestions regarding making the definitions clearer. We have added 
several paragraphs in the methods/data section outlining these distinctions and have 
cleaned the language to make it more uniform throughout the paper. 
 
R1 asked for all non-significant variables to be included. We feel that this will take away 
from the narrative thrust and clarity of the paper. We have instead inserted a footnote 
outlining that these (and the codebook itself) are available from the first author by 
request. 
 
R1 asked for greater clarity with regards the write-up of the result and we have done 
so. This included altering the results table itself. 
 
R1 requested that table 2's title was changed and this has been done. 
 
R1 requested we delete our discussion regarding 'black swan events'. This has been 
done. 
 
R1 made several insightful comments regarding risk factors. We completely agree with 
these assertions and have amended the wording throughout that we are actually 
looking at 'indicators' 
 
R2 requested that the abstract be changed to reflect the results and conclusions. This 
has been done. 
 
R2 made several comments regarding the "literature review". Given the comments, we 
actually feel the reviewer is referring to the introductory section (which has been paired 
down and re-written to reflect some concerns). We also contest the reviewer's point 
that a good literature reviews job is to highlight why this study is important. The job for 
our literature review is to set up the theoretical reasoning for why we are carrying out 
these specific tests. The lit review looks at the findings from the general crime 
literature. We have re-written the intro section to more clearly state why this work is it 
important (which is really at the heart of R2's comments). 
 
R2&R3 made some comments about the structure and headings of the methods 
sections. We have extensively re-written the data and methods section (adding around 
800 words) 
 
R2 made comments about the need for sub-headings in the Results section and this 
has been carried out. 
 
R2&R3 made comments about the need to improve and flesh out the 
discussion/conclusion section. We have extensively re-written this section including 
more closely incorporating the implications of our specific results. 
 
R3 makes a comment about outlining crime base rates and this has been added to our 
methods/data section. 
R3 requests additional citations for paragraph 2 and these have been included. 
R3 makes a comment about the phrase 'random behaviour' which led to some 
understandable confusion. We have corrected this to 'random chance'. 
 
R3 requests that the sample size of the 2 cohorts is included and this has been carried 
out. 
 Title Page including all author information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicators of Lone Actor Violent Events: The Problems of 
 
 
Low Base Rates & Long Observational Periods 
Keywords: terrorism, violent extremism, lone actor, mass murderer, crime prevention. 
Paul Gill – Department of Security and Crime Science, University College London 
(paul.gill@ucl.ac.uk) 
John Horgan – Global Studies Institute and Department of Psychology, Georgia State 
University (JHorgan@gsu.edu) 
Emily Corner - Department of Security and Crime Science, University College 
London (e.corner.12@ucl.ac.uk) 
James Silver – Center for Terrorism and Security Studies, UMass Lowell 
(james_silver@uml.edu) 
 
Keywords: terrorism, risk factors, indicators, lone actor, mass murderer, threat 
management 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
A burgeoning literature exists on indicators associated with lone-actor terrorism, spree 
shooters, mass murders and other forms of targeted violence. Such studies of low- 
likelihood, high-impact crimes largely suffer from two inter-related problems: low 
base rates and long observational periods.  These studies largely fail to consider 
whether risk factors are driven by temporal-cohorts within the wider observation pool 
or are uniform across the expanses of time under consideration. This paper compares 
a cohort of violent lone actors (composed of  lone-actor terrorists, and solo mass 
murderer attackers) from 1990-2005 with a cohort from 2006 to 2013. We found no 
significant differences in terms of socio-demographic variables across the two 
temporal periods. The 2006-2013 cohort was significantly more likely to use the 
Internet in their attack planning, have a history of previous imprisonment, engage in 
multiple attack methods (e.g. a bombing and a shooting), and target ordinary citizens 
rather than a political or military target for example. The results also indicate that the 
2006-2013 period contains fewer offenders who (a) had previous military experience 
(b) made verbal statements to family/friends/wider audiences about their intent and 
beliefs (c) socialized face to face with members of a wider network (d) experienced 
being degraded or the target of an act of prejudice or unfairness (e) experienced a 
recent stressor and (f) interacted face-to-face with others holding a 
similar grievance. The conclusion discusses the research and operational implications 
of these findings. 
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Indicators of Lone Actor Violent Events: The Problems of Low Base Rates & Long 
 
Observational Periods 
 
 
 
 
An increasing number of empirical studies focus upon the factors preceding violent acts 
that can be categorized as largely high-impact (in societal terms), low-likelihood events. 
These include offences like school shootings (Langman, 2009), mass murder (Bowers et 
al, 2010; Gill et al., 2017b), lone actor terrorism (Gill et al, 2014; Meloy & Gill, 2016) 
and spree shooting (Lankford, 2013). They are typically informed by studies that examine 
crimes (many of which are violent) that can be categorized as largely high-likelihood, 
low-impact events. They utilize similar methods and analyze similar risk factors. These 
high-likelihood, low- societal impact crimes vary from arson to stalking. 
 
 
 
Whilst the burgeoning number and rigorous quality of data-driven approaches is to be 
welcomed, a key methodological factor differentiates these two types of crime studies. 
Studies of high-likelihood, low-impact crimes often utilize a sample of offenders that are 
highly clustered temporally. For example, they analyze offenders from a wider cohort 
born in the same year (and often in the same town) (see for example 
http://www.scopic.ac.uk/StudiesPADS.html). Such studies can afford to do so simply 
because of the high volume of observable offenders and offences. Such approaches can 
potentially highlight risk factors that are relevant to that cohort or geographic space 
(Kaplan, 1995). This is important because it allows outlier risk factors to be weeded out 
via replication studies conducted in very different locations and at very different times 
(Farrington, 2015). 
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The study of indicators associated with engaging in high-impact, low-likelihood violent 
events is afforded no such luxury because thankfully these crimes remain rare. Instead, 
these studies collect data on offenders across a large number of years. For example, 
Meloy et al. (2001) analyze offender characteristics of 34 mass murderers (individuals 
who killed three or more in a single event) over a 41-year period.  Hempel, Meloy, and 
Richard’s (1999) analysis of mass murderers focuses on 30 cases spread over 50 years. 
Gill (2015) analyzes 111 lone-actor terrorists from 1990 to 2014. Finally, Fein and 
Vossekuil’s (1999) behavioral analysis of 83 assassins, attackers, and near lethal 
approachers stretches across a 50-year period. Each study highlights supposed indicators, 
yet fails to consider whether these factors are driven by temporal-cohorts within the 
wider observation pool or are uniform across the expanses of time under consideration. 
We never know if the high prevalence of one factor in the overall sample is due to it 
being universally present in a small time frame, or whether it is distributed evenly across 
time. This is potentially most worrisome in those analyses where the number of years of 
study is far greater than the number of individuals analyzed. In other words, though the 
complete descriptive results may indicate a large propensity for a behavior to occur, a 
temporal analysis may indicate that the propensity for the behavior to occur actually 
decreases (or increases) over time. 
 
 
 
Consequently, and unless this is specified, there may be different implications for future 
investigations. The study of low-likelihood high-impact crimes therefore runs the risk of 
identifying risk factors and indicators heavily skewed toward older time periods (thereby 
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increasing false positives) or missing emerging risk factors associated with more recent 
times (thereby increasing false negatives). This has major repercussions for how threat 
management protocols are developed going forward. It may therefore be useful to 
determine whether facets of offender behavior are increasing/decreasing across time and 
whether this trend (if any) is statistically distinguishable from random chance. 
 
 
 
This paper compares a cohort of violent lone actors (composed of lone actor terrorists, 
and solo mass murderer attackers) from 1990-2005 (n=79) with a cohort from 2006 to 
2013 (n = 107). The latter period witnessed a step-change in the rate and intensity of lone 
actor mass violent events so a corollary to this exploration of whether indicators differ 
across time is to try and identify factors that may help explain this recent increase in 
events. 
 
 
 
Do ‘Indicators’ Change Over Time? Learning from High-Likelihood, Low-Impact 
 
Crimes 
 
 
 
 
In 1995, Kaplan lamented that studies have not demonstrated the association between risk 
factors and criminality for two different generational cohorts. Twenty years later, 
Farrington et al (2015, p. 48) outlined that a “key issue in criminology is to what extent 
are risk factors for offending similar over time”, yet the “question has rarely been 
investigated”. As mentioned previously, the risk factor and indicator literature related to 
violent and frequent crime is typically unworried by this temporality/generalizability 
issue because the volume of such studies can distinguish between risk factors that are 
4  
common or outliers. The alternative to such approaches is to compare similar crimes in 
similar contexts, but in different temporal eras. We are aware of only four such studies, 
three of which have been published since 2013. This section briefly outlines these 
studies. 
 
 
 
Farrington et al (2015) investigated the extent to which a wide variety of risk factors can 
predict general offending across two generations. Utilizing the Cambridge Study in 
Delinquent Development they compared the original sample of 411 males from London 
collected in the 1960s with their children during the year 2004 to 2013. Risk factors for 
both generational cohorts were positively correlated. Eleven risk factors were significant 
predictors for offending in both generations. They included a convicted father and 
mother, harsh discipline, poor parental supervision, a disrupted family, low family 
income, large family size, poor housing, low school attainment, daring/risk-taking, and 
antisocial child behavior. The findings only distinctly differed on three factors: parental 
conflict, low social class, and hyperactivity/attention problems (although this last risk 
factor was measured differently across the two generations). The risk factors were 
therefore generally very robust across generations with the authors concluding, “most of 
the findings in one generation were remarkably replicable in the next generation” (2015, 
p. 60). 
 
 
 
Menard and Johnson (2015) employed a similar research design to Farrington et al. 
(2015). They analyzed data from the National Youth Survey Family Study (NYSFS), 
which had an original sample of 2,360 youths aged between 11 and 17 in late 1976. 
Menard and Johnson compared the results of this original sample group with the sample 
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group’s children in 2003-2004. They found similar inter-generational risk factor 
robustness in terms of delinquent peer bonding and offending. Differences emerged in 
terms of gender as a predictor between generations 1 and 2 (e.g. being a male is less 
important), while the impact of school strain (e.g. poor grades and lower expectations of 
gaining a college education) became an important predictor in the later generation. 
 
 
 
Johnson et al. (2015) utilizes the same data as Menard and Johnson (2015) but tests a 
different series of predictor variables. Seven of the nine predictors demonstrated the same 
significance scores and direction in relationship inter-generationally. The earlier 
generation was more heavily influenced by negative life events (for example parental 
divorce/separation), whilst the later generation was more influenced by delinquent peer 
association. 
 
 
 
Farrington and Loeber (1999) came to similar conclusions in their comparative study of 
the 411 London males from the 1960s (mentioned above) with a replication study entitled 
the Pittsburgh Youth Study, which examined 508 males in the 1980s. The results 
indicated that the risk factors were not only temporally robust but also geographically 
robust. 
 
 
 
The four studies therefore illustrate that risk factors associated with general offending and 
delinquency have proven to be quite robust across generational cohorts. We are interested 
in whether a similar cross-sectional design produces similar robust findings in a sample 
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of lone-actor terrorists and mass murderers. In the next section, we conduct a series of 
analyses to investigate whether the same holds true for lone actor violent events. 
 
 
 
Data and Method 
 
Sample: 
 
 
 
 
We used open source data collection methods to develop a unique dataset that categorizes 
the socio-demographic, developmental antecedent attack, attack preparation and 
commission properties of 71 lone actor terrorists and 115 mass murderers. The 71 lone 
actor terrorists include two individuals who displayed direct command and control links 
from a wider terrorist organization but engaged in their violence by themselves. This 
addresses the paucity of data that has long been noted in the study of terrorists and mass 
murderers (Silke, 2013). To reduce bias in the sample, we limit our focus to United 
States-based offenders. The level of available behavioral data is far higher than that of 
group-based offenders who operate on behalf of a prolific group. From experience of 
previous data- collection endeavors (Gill and Horgan, 2013), it is very difficult to obtain 
much more than the very basic socio-demographic information of such group offenders 
from open sources (see Gill, 2015 for a longer discussion).  
 
 
 
Inclusion Criteria: 
 
Despite the palpable rise in public anxiety following events such as Columbine, Aurora, 
and Sandy Hook, the fact remains that mass murder is a rare event in the U.S compared 
to homicides with fewer fatalities.  From 1976 to 2000, the percentage of murders that 
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involved more than one victim ranged from 3% to 4% of homicides per year (Fox & 
 
Zawitz, 2003).  A review of the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports from 2000 to 
 
2012 shows that the number of mass murders (four or more victims) was approximately 
one-tenth of one percent of all murders (excluding the 9/11 deaths).  Nevertheless, 
perhaps because it occurs so infrequently but is so disturbing, there are few crimes that 
receive more news coverage than mass murder (Duwe, 2000). 
 
 
 
Prior to data collection, academic literature on lone actor terrorism was examined and 
from there an actor dictionary was built. This actor dictionary encompassed a list of 
offenders fitting the above criteria. Further names were also sourced through tailored 
search strings developed and applied to the LexisNexis “All English News” option. More 
individuals were also identified through the Global Terrorism Database developed by the 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) 
and lists of those convicted of terrorism-related offences in the United Kingdom and the 
United States. We also examined the academic literature on mass murderers and built an 
actor dictionary, producing a list of names that fit our criteria (see below).  Next, we 
identified additional offenders through databases created by Mother Jones, USA Today 
and Mayors Against Illegal Guns.  Finally, we conducted searches on Lexis/Nexis using 
specific terms and searched the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports 
for each year of the relevant time period to find other offenders who meet our criteria. 
Our final sample comprises 115 mass murderers. 
 
 
 
 
Definition: 
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A pervasive problem with research on mass murder is the shifting definition of what 
exactly is a mass murder. Some criteria that have been considered include offender 
motive (Hempel, Meloy & Richards, 1999), the type of weapon used (Hempel et al., 
1999) and the number of wounded (Dietz, 1986).  Generally, these criteria are not relied 
upon in the literature, perhaps because they appear to be arbitrary.  There is, however, 
general agreement that a mass murder involves multiple victims killed at one location (or 
multiple but geographically close locations) over a relatively short period of time (Dietz, 
1986: Holmes & Holmes, 1992; Hempel et al., 1999; Fox & Levin, 2003). 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, there is less agreement about the minimum number of victims required to 
define a murder event as “mass”.  Some researchers use a threshold of two victims 
(Palermo & Ross, 1999), others use three (Dietz, 1986; Holmes & Holmes, 1992), and 
still others use four (Duwe, 2000; Fox & Levin, 1998).  The definition used in this study 
is four or more victims (not including the offender) for the following reasons. First, four 
or more victims (not including the offender) is the demarcation line accepted by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation in its 2005 report: Serial Murder: Multi-Disciplinary 
Perspectives for Investigators, released after a meeting of experts in various fields 
relevant to the study of multiple homicides. This definition of mass murder as involving 
four or more fatalities was the result of considered reflection by the leading academics 
(criminologists, psychologists, forensic psychiatrists), and practitioners (state and federal 
law enforcement officials and prosecutors) brought together by the FBI for the specific 
purpose of clarifying issues related to serial and mass murder. 
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Second, in studies such as the present one where data are collected via open source 
research methods, the number of victims is an important determinant of media coverage 
of multiple murder events. Research has suggested that media attention given to any 
mass murder is affected by certain factors, and high profile mass murders are 
significantly more likely to involve larger numbers of killed and wounded, stranger 
victims, public locations, assault weapons and workplace violence (Duwe, 2000). 
 
 
 
Third, practical considerations necessitated a threshold of four victims instead of three. 
A review of the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports from 1976 to 1999 reveals that 
there are over three times as many cases of three victim homicides as there are four 
victim homicides (Duwe, 2004).  Employing a mass murder definition of three or more 
victims would have necessitated reducing the time span of the study from approximately 
24 years, to at most eight years.  While that approach may be useful in future research, 
this study opts for the use of a greater time span that also matched the time span 
utilized in the previous lone actor terrorist data collection endeavors. 
 
 
 
To facilitate comparison to lone actor terrorists who, by definition, act alone and without 
direction or support, the sample includes only mass murderers who acted alone.  In 
keeping with that same principle, the study also excludes state-sponsored as well as gang 
and organized crime related incidents. Also, attacks that are solely family-oriented and 
took place within the offender’s domicile are excluded, as these are frequently treated 
separately in the literature and appear to have a distinct genesis (Campbell, Glass, Sharps, 
Laughon, & Bloom, 2007). 
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Codebook and Coding Process: 
 
The codebook used in this project was developed based on a review of literature on 
individuals who commit a wide range of violent and non-violent crimes, are victimized, 
and/or engage in high-risk behaviours as well as a review of other existing codebooks 
used in the construction of terrorism-related databases. The variables included in the 
codebook span socio-demographic information (e.g., age, gender, occupation, family 
characteristics, relationship status, occupation, employment, etc.), antecedent event 
behaviours (e.g., aspects of the individual’s behaviours towards others and within their 
day-to-day routines), event specific behaviours (e.g., attack methods, who was targeted) 
and post-event behaviours and experiences (e.g., claims of responsibility, 
arrest/conviction details, etc.). Data were collected on demographic and background 
characteristics and antecedent event behaviours by examining and coding information 
contained in open source news reports, sworn affidavits and when possible, openly 
available first-hand accounts. The vast majority of sources came from tailored 
LexisNexis searches. Information was gleaned from relevant documents across online 
public record depositories such as documentcloud.org, biographies of a number of lone 
actors and all available scholarly articles. For a definition of different variables, see Gill 
et. al (2014). 
 
 
 
Three independent coders coded each observation separately. After an observation was 
coded, the results were reconciled in two stages (coder A with coder B, and then coders 
A+B with C). In cases when three coders could not agree on particular variables, 
differences were resolved by a senior member of the research team based on an 
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examination of the original sources that the coders relied upon to make their assessments. 
Such decisions factored in the comparative reliability and quality of the sources (e.g., 
reports that cover trial proceedings vs. reports issued in the immediate aftermath of the 
event) and the sources cited in the report. 
 
 
 
Method: 
 
We set out to compare the prevalence of indicators across two temporal domains within 
this combined sample of lone-actor terrorists and solo mass murderers. We decided to 
split the sample from 1990-2005 (n=79) and 2006-2013 (n=107). This is because from 
2006 onwards, there was a distinct scale shift in the number of actors per year. The period 
 
1990-2005 averages 5 per year. The corresponding figure for 2006-2013 is 12.75. 
 
 
 
 
We then used bivariate analyses (chi-square) to compare the prevalence of socio-
demographic and behavioral differences. Those variables displaying significant 
differences (p<.05) and near significant differences (p<.1) were then entered into a 
logistic regression to illustrate which factors held the most predictive power as to whether 
they occurred within the phase 1990-2005 (0) or 2006-2013 (1). 
 
 
 
Results 
 
 
Bivariate Analyses 
 
 
 
 
We found no significant differences in terms of socio-demographic variables across the 
two temporal periods. This included factors such as age, education, and socio-economic 
12  
status. We then tested over 70 antecedent event variables.1 Table 1 outlines those 
variables with significant differences. 
 
 
 
<Insert Table 1 Here> 
 
 
 
 
Overall, the results indicate that very few behaviors can be solely attributable to the 
upward scale shift in lone-actor and mass murdered incidents in the 2006-2013 period. 
Out of the vast number of behaviors tested, only four show a greater preponderance in the 
2006-2013 era. Perhaps it is no great surprise that offenders are now significantly more 
likely to make use of the Internet in their planning given its ubiquity in routine activities 
for the whole population, but the percentage rise is still relatively small (17%) compared 
to the more than doubling of events in both time periods.  The 2006-2013 cohort is also 
significantly more likely to have been previously imprisoned, engaged in multiple attack 
methods (e.g. a bombing and a shooting), and targeted ordinary citizens rather than a 
political or military target for example. 
 
 
 
The results also indicate that the 2006-2013 period contains fewer offenders who (a) had 
previous military experience (b) made verbal statements to family/friends/wider 
audiences about their intent and beliefs (c) socialized face to face with members of a 
wider network (d) experienced being degraded or the target of an act of prejudice or 
unfairness (e) experienced a recent stressor and (f) interacted face-to-face with others 
holding a similar grievance. 
 
 
 
 
1 Please contact the lead author for the codebook and list of variables tested. 
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Multivariate Analysis 
 
 
 
 
The logistic regression shows that, in combination, the independent variables 
significantly impacted on temporal era, X²(14) = 54.965, p <0.001. The model correctly 
predicted 72.6% of responses. Specific individual variables were significant predictors of 
year of attack as shown in Table 2. Odds of greater than one indicate a positive 
relationship between the predictor and dependent variable. Those individuals with 
military experience were more likely to carry out an attack in the years 1990-2005. 
Individuals who utilized multiple different weapons in an attack were more likely to carry 
out the attack in the years 2006-2013. 
 
 
 
<Insert Table 2 Here> 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Together the results illustrate the need to think about temporal issues in the study of risk 
factors, indicators and low-likelihood events. Approximately 20% of the variables tested 
in a bivariate manner displayed demonstrably different prevalence rates across two eras. 
This has several implications. First, we should treat with caution some findings related to 
indicators in studies of low-likelihood, high-impact events. This is especially the case for 
those studies where the years under consideration are greater than (or even approximate 
to) the number of units of observation because there is likely a great variance within the 
sample. Because of this caution, studies should highlight this fact and draw some 
inferences about 
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which variables are on the increase/decrease. It should now be routine to carry out 
such temporal analyses going forward. Otherwise applications of these research 
endeavors may unexpectedly increase both false positives and false negatives in the 
field. 
 
 
 
Second, the findings might necessitate moving away from looking at risk factors and 
indicators in isolation. Instead, perhaps we should look at how factors cluster, sequence 
and crystalize (Gill, 2015) and whether some risk factors and indicators act as substitutes 
in the absence of others (e.g. does the internet replace the need for face-to-face 
interaction with co-ideologues - see Gill et al., 2017a). 
 
 
 
Third, the bivariate results illustrated that a number of risk factors and indicators that 
were significantly less prevalent in the later temporal cohort. This might be indicative 
that the crystallization of risk factors noted elsewhere (see Gill et al., 2014; Gill, 2015) 
has perhaps become more diffuse in the 2006-2013 period. 
 
 
 
Fourth, some of the shifts in prevalence can be explained easily. For example, the internet 
has become ubiquitous in everyday life for all sorts of everyday purposes. It should be no 
surprise that some increasingly also use it for malevolent purposes. Other significant 
findings may be hypothesized to be a consequence of learning. For example, the decrease 
in leakage, both in terms of communicating intent and others being aware of the 
grievance, significantly decreased across the two time-periods. Potential offenders may 
simply have learned that similar offences were disrupted directly due to leakage and so 
they changed their behavior accordingly. Other significant findings could be explained as 
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being a by-product of other developments. For example, the increased use in multiple 
attack types may be due to the greater accessibility to bomb-making manuals via the 
Internet. The causal mechanism through which some behaviors significantly 
increased/decreased is very difficult to discern however. For example, it is not 
immediately obvious why the later temporal cohort was significantly less likely to 
experience recent stressors. 
 
 
 
Fifth, it is worth re-iterating that prior military experience was one of only two significant 
factors in the multivariate analysis. Its presence is significantly less likely in the later 
temporal cohort. Whilst prior military experience is often noted in media reports 
regarding the increase in mass murder events, the statistics suggest this factor only 
appears a third as much in the current era than it did in the 1990-2005 era. This suggests 
that some so-called indicators may have cohort-effects, rather than having stable 
influences over time. This is particularly startling when we consider the base rate of 
military experience within the United States presumably increased following recent wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
 
 
 
Finally, the results highlight the need for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to 
consistently update their threat and risk assessment protocols because some factors that 
underpin risk may be dynamic in nature. Although this is often implied within the wider 
threat management literature, the idea remained untested in a scientific manner until this 
article. The development of risk assessment tools of extremists (be they politically or 
personally inspired) has gathered pace in the past couple of years. Examples include 
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the development of the TRAP-18 (Meloy et al., 2015), the Identifying Vulnerable People 
tool (Egan et al., 2016), the ERG 22+ (Lloyd & Dean, 2015) and the VERA and its later 
iterations (Pressman, 2009). Each should place a temporal examination of their results at 
the heart of their next 
examination. Technological, societal and environmental changes can open a gateway for 
 
a new generation of offenders or act as a deterrent and hence the indictors associated with 
these types of crimes can change. Relatedly, it calls for the need for continuous and 
systematic data collection procedures. 
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Table 1: Bivariate Comparison of Behaviors between 1990-2005 and 2006-2013 
 
 
 
 
      95% Confidence 
 
Interval 
Variable X² 1990- 
 
2005 
(%) 
(n=79) 
2006- 
 
2014 
(%) 
(n=107) 
p Odds 
 
Ratio 
Lower Upper 
Military 
 
Experience 
15.590 38.0 13.1 0.001*** 0.246 0.119 0.506 
Previous 
 
Imprisonment 
4.274 21.5 35.5 0.039** 2.009 1.031 3.913 
Verbalized Intent 
 
to Family 
4.266 50.6 35.5 0.039** 0.537 0.297 0.971 
Verbalized Intent 
 
to Wider Audience 
9.035 50.6 29.0 0.003** 0.398 0.217 0.730 
Others Aware of 
 
Grievance 
9.611 72.2 49.5 0.002** 0.379 0.204 0.705 
Experienced a 
 
Tipping Point 
12.835 65.8 39.3 0.001*** 0.336 0.183 0.615 
Experienced being 
 
Degraded 
9.923 43.0 21.5 0.002** 0.362 0.191 0.688 
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Target of Injustice 13.246 45.6 20.6 0.001*** 0.309 0.162 0.589 
Experienced 
 
Recent Stressor 
4.951 59.5 43.0 0.026* 0.513 0.285 0.926 
Multiple Attack 
 
Methods 
4.510 12.7 25.2 0.034* 2.329 1.053 5.151 
Non-Discriminate 
 
Target 
5.309 26.6 43.0 0.021* 2.083 1.110 3.907 
Face to Face 
 
Interaction 
9.449 31.6 13.1 0.002** 0.325 0.156 0.678 
Substance Use Prior 
to Event 
2.991 8.9 17.8 0.084 2.221 0.884 5.577 
Expressed Desire to 
Hurt Others 
3.032 63.3 50.5 0.082 0.591 0.326 1.070 
 
 
 
***=p<.001; **=p<.01; *p=<.05; 
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Table 2: Logistic Regression Determining Impact of Behaviors on Era 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
95% CI for Odds Ratio 
 
Variable B (SE) Significance Lower Exp (B) Upper 
 
Military Experience -1.272(0.438) 0.004** 0.119 0.280 0.662 
 
Previous Imprisonment 0.616(0.407) 0.129 0.835 1.852 4.109 
 
Verbalized Intent to Family -0.283(0.417) 0.497 0.333 0.754 1.706 
 
Verbalized Intent to Wider 
 
Audience 
-0.345(0.426) 0.419 0.307 0.708 1.633 
 
Others Aware of Grievance 0.379(0.463) 0.414 0.589 1.460 3.662 
 
Experienced a Tipping Point -0.605(0.409) 0.139 0.245 0.546 1.217 
 
Experienced being Degraded -0.586(0.412) 0.155 0.248 0.557 1.248 
 
Target of Injustice -0.586(0.412) 0.111 0.208 0.494 1.174 
 
Expressed Desire to Hurt 
 
Others 
-0.705(0.442) 0.595 0.369 0.808 1.771 
 
Experienced Recent Stressor -0.408(0.382) 0.286 0.315 0.665 1.406 
 
Substance Use Prior to Event 0.218(0.577) 0.705 0.402 1.244 3.851 
 
Multiple Attack Methods 0.871(0.495) 0.079 0.905 2.389 6.307 
 
Non-Discriminate Target 0.442(0.398) 0.267 0.713 1.556 3.395 
 
Face to Face Interaction -1.137(0.484) 0.019* 0.124 0.321 0.829 
 
Constant 1.426 0.003 4.162 
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Note: B= regression coefficient, Exp (B)= odds ratio 
 
***=p<.001; **=p<.01; *p=<.05; 
